Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 43

Issue 1

Article 9

April 1966

Special Damages
Ronald Hankin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald Hankin, Special Damages , 43 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 50 (1966).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol43/iss1/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

tiff, the town constable, had arrested Ayers in the public square for breach
of a town ordinance and had taken a knife away from him. Later plaintiff
was accused by Ayers of stealing the knife and some money. The charge of
stealing was understood by the hearers to relate to the arrest. The lower
court refused defendant's request for an instruction to the effect that if
the words were proven to have been spoken by defendant about and in
relation to a known act, and that act in law was not a felony, which was
known by the bystanders, the defendant should be found not guilty. Said
the court:
Actionable words impute malice, and that is the gist of the action;
it is a question of intention, therefore, sufficiently evidenced by the
use of actionable words, unaccompanied by explanatory words or
circumstances. These, however, may show the intention to have
been innocent; the presumption of malice is wanting and no
foundation for the action exists....
Under these circumstances no larceny could be committed, as
such a taking could at most only amount to a trespass, and therefore, being spoken in reference to such a transaction, and so understood by the hearers, they were not actionable, and the court
should have granted a new trial. 6
Passion will not rebut malice implied. In Hosley v. Brooks, 7 at the time
of the alleged defamatory utterance, defendant was angry and in a fit of
passion. Said the court in upholding a decision for the plaintiff: "Our law
implies malice from the speaking of the words, and the heat of the aggressor's
passions has no tendency to rebut the malice thus implied."8
RONALD HANKIN

SPECIAL DAMAGES
In actions for libel and slander, it is essential for the plaintiff to allege
and prove special damages resulting from the defamatory statement before
he will be entitled to recover, unless the words are actionable per se. "One
who falsely and without a privilege to do so publishes a slander which,
although not actionable per se, is the legal cause of special harm to the
person defamed, is liable to him."'
"Special damages" means that there must be specific proof of a
of malice by proof." See also Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein, 62 Ill. 115 (1871); Schofield v.
Baldwin, 102 Ill. App. 560 (Ist Dist. 1902).
6 Ayers v. Grider, 15 Ill. 37, 38 (1853).
7 20 Ill. 116 (1858); see also Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485, 487 (1873): "...
as the law
implied malice from the speaking of actionable words, the passion of the slanderer could
have no tendency to rebut the malice thus implied."

8 Hosley v. Brooks, supra note 7, at 119.
I Restatement, Torts § 575 (1938).
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pecuniary loss, as distinct from general damage to reputation assumed to
follow. 2 Of this requirement, McCormick has said:
What injury will satisfy this requirement of "special damage?"
Here again the mark of history is apparent in the requirement that
the injury must be a pecuniary or material one. This was evolved
as a basis for classifying in a group of slander cases which the law
courts would withdraw to themselves from the ecclesiastical tribunals, whose jurisdiction was "spiritual." The requirement is often
rigorously applied today, though occasionally relaxed, and affords
another hurdle with which the judge can confront the dubious
claim. Thus it is not usually enough for the plaintiff to plead that
the publication of the slander has humiliatedor embarrassed him,
or has been productive of mental anguish, or even that actual sickness has been brought on.3
The Restatement also adopts the view that special damages must be pecu4
niary in nature.
Slanderous words, no matter how grossly defamatory or insulting they
may be, which cannot be fitted into the arbitrary categories of defamation
per se, are actionable only upon proper averment of special damages. Thus,
in Campbell v. Morris,5 defendant circulated an "official warning circular"
to other members of the Mason organization, stating that plaintiff, who was
a physician, bank president and candidate for state senator, "poses as a
Mason in good standing." The court found that the statement was not
libelous per se, and, since the plaintiff had not averred special damages, the
granting of defendant's demurrer was sustained. The same result was reached
in Mitchell v. Tribune Co.,6 where two articles labelled plaintiff as a
"chink," and Ward v. ForestPreserve Dist. of Winnebago,7 where defendant
2 White v. Bourquin, 204 111. App. 83 (2d Dist. 1917); Post Publ. Co. v. Butler, 137
Fed. 723 (6th Cir. 1905).
8 McCormick, Damages § 114, at 419 (1935).
4 Restatement, Torts § 575, Comment b (1938):
Special harm. Special harm as the words are used in this Chapter is harm of
a material and generally of a pecuniary nature. . . . Loss of reputation to the
person defamed is not sufficient to make the defamer liable under the rule stated
in this Section unless it is reflected in material harm. So too, lowered social standing and its purely social consequences are not sufficient.... If, however, the loss
of reputation results in material loss capable of being measured in money with
approximate exactness, the fact that the lowered social standing resulting from
the slander itself causes the acts which produce such loss does not prevent the
tangible loss from being special harm. Thus, while a slander which has been so
widely disseminated as to cause persons previously friendly to the plaintiff to
refuse social intercourse with him is not of itself special harm, the loss of the material advantages of their hospitality is sufficient. Special harm may be a loss of
presently existing advantages, as a discharge from employment. It may also be a
failure to realize a reasonable expectation of gain, as the denial of employment
which, but for the currency of the slander, the plaintiff would have received. It
is not necessary that he be legally entitled to receive the benefits which are denied
to him because of the slander. It is enough that the slander has disappointed
his reasonable expectation of receiving a gratuity.
5 224 Ill. App. 569 (4th Dist. 1922).
6 343 Ill. App. 446, 99 N.E.2d 397 (lst Dist. 1951).
7 13 Ill. App. 2d 257, 141 N.E.2d 753 (2d Dist. 1957).
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orally called plaintiff, a forest district employee, a "communist." In each of
these cases, the defendant's remark was found not to be actionable per se,
and, since no special damages were alleged, the action was dismissed.
The requirement of pleading and proving special damages is not
satisfied by general allegations or evidence of damage. For example, in
Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,8 the plaintiff, a white woman, was refused
service in the defendant's store and called a "nigger" by the defendant's
servants. The words were held not slanderous per se. As to special damages,
the plaintiff charged that the statement tended to "exclude her from society,
and by reason of said false and defamatoey publication the plaintiff has
been injured in her reputation as well as in her business, and has sustained
mental suffering to her damage .

.

. " These allegations were found to be

descriptive only of general and not special damagesY
Allegations that the plaintiff was shunned and avoided by others are
not enough unless pecuniary harm results. Thus, in Clavin v. Froelich,'0
the defendant had said of plaintiff, a cashier in a bank, "Clavin is an Irish
bullhead and was run out of Marine (Village) ....

You had better put him

out of the bank or you will lose business." The complaint alleged that the
plaintiff had been greatly injured and damaged in his good name, credit,
reputation and business, that divers people at the bank had refused to have
dealings with him as cashier, that he was greatly damaged and injured and
hindered in his dealings as cashier and deprived of compensation and profit
that otherwise would be due to him. The court, without discussion, held
that the complaint lacked an allegation of special damages and that a
demurrer was properly sustained.
The actual loss of customers or business as a result of the defamatory
remark is a prime example of special damages." However, it may be very
difficult for the plaintiff to show that he has lost specific customers as a
proximate result of the defamatory statement, even though he may be able
to show that his business in general has fallen off. Therefore, the majority
of courts have held that a general allegation of loss of business, with proof
of a general decline, and the negation of other possible causes, will be
8 281 Ill. App. 495 (4th Dist. 1935).

9 See Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1st Dist. 1939).
10 162 Il1. App. 50 (3d Dist. 1911).
11 Prosser, Torts 779 (3d ed. 1964). A distinction must be made between actual harm
to the plaintiff in his trade, occupation or business as special damages, and words calculated to harm the plaintiff in his trade, occupation or business as slander per se. In the
latter case, the words are actionable whether any harm actually results to the plaintiff or
not; in the former, the words are actionable if they result in actual harm, even if they
were not spoken of the plaintiff in his business capacity. For example, a statement that a
surgeon is a "butcher" would be uttered of him in his professional capacity and would
be actionable even if no one believed the accusation and his business did not fall off.
The statement would be slander per se. However, a statement that the surgeon was a
"lecher" would not be slander per se, though defamatory, and would require a showing
that the plaintiff actually lost customers as a result of the statement. If he did, recovery
would be had even though the words were not uttered of him in his business capacity.
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sufficient where it is impossible to be more specific. 1 2 Thus, in Trenton Mut.

Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Perrine,'3 the New Jersey Supreme Court of Judicature said:
The objection relied upon is that the declaration should have
stated by name what persons have refused to insure their lives and
property in the company by reason of the libel, and from whom
they would otherwise have received greater gains.
The general rule certainly is, that where the plaintiff alleges,
by way of special damage, the loss of customers in the way of his
trade, or the refusal of friends and acquaintances to associate with
him, or the loss of marriage, or the loss of service, the names of
such customers or friends, or the name of the person with whom
marriage would have been contracted, or services performed, must
be stated.
But the rule is relaxed when the individuals may be supposed
to be unknown to the plaintiff, or where it is impossible to specify
them, or where they are so numerous as to excuse a specific description on the score of inconvenience.
However, one Illinois court has apparently declined to relax the plaintiff's burden and has required that particular contracts and sales lost must
be pleaded as a necessary step to recovery. In Life Printing & Publ. Co. v.
Marshall Field,14 plaintiff charged that the defendant newspaper had
printed articles intimating that he was a member of an anti-semetic group.
In affirming the lower court's judgment for the defendant, the court said:
Plaintiff cannot recover on its theory of special damages,
which as shown above are based on general allegations that many
advertisers and other persons, and especially persons of Jewish
descent, have, because of the publications complained of, declined
and refused to have any business transactions with plaintiff, and
loss has resulted to plaintiff. This is not a sufficient allegation of
special
damages. Such damages must be alleged with particular15
ity.

There is a paucity of other decisions in Illinois dealing with the proper
12 Prosser, Torts 779 (3d ed. 1964). See, e.g., Ross v. Fitch, 58 Tex. 148 (1882)
(loss of prospective customers); Denny v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n, 55 Wash. 331, 104
Pac. 769 (1909) (loss of credit).
13 23 N.J.L. 402, 414 (1852).
14 324 111. App. 254, 58 N.E.2d 307 (1st Dist. 1944).
15 Id. at 263, 58 N.E.2d at 311. Accord, Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N.W. 68,
69 (1886):
It is indispensable to allege and show a loss of sale to some particular person,
for the loss of a sale to some particular person is the special damage, and of the
gist and substance of the action.... If there is no such person, there is no cause
of action; and it follows that the failure to name the particular person or persons
to whom a sale could have been effected, if it had not been prevented by the
disparagement, does not present a case of mere indefiniteness, but of total absence
of an allegation essential to the statement of a cause of action ....
See also Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 46 Ill. App. 2d 355 (1st Dist. 1964) (losses must be
alleged with particularity). But cf. Randall Dairy Co. v. Beverly Dairy Co., 291 Ill. App.
380, 391 (4th Dist. 1937) (testimony that there was a general loss of customers; "this cannot be regarded as a coincidence').
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averment of special damages. In Hudson v. Slack Furniture Co.,'8 the defendant sent a wage assignment to the plaintiff's employer, a railroad which
had a policy of firing employees after such assignments. The plaintiff alleged
as special damages some incidental bills incurred in getting a release of the
assignment, but proved no other pecuniary loss since only a warning had
been issued by his employer. The court felt that some special damage had
been shown and that recovery could be allowed, but held that an award of
five hundred dollars was excessive. In Bradley v. Bakke, 17 the court indicated in dictum that an allegation that a maid accused of stealing newspapers had been discharged without references was a proper averment of
special damages. On the other hand, in Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,'8
an allegation of mental suffering was held insufficient as an element of
special damage.
In Hambric v. Field Enterprises,'9 the complaint alleged that a newspaper article alleged that the plaintiff ran a saloon at which a strip tease
had been performed. The plaintiff charged that the article damaged his
good name, reputation and business, exposed him to public hatred and
obloquy, attracted to his place of business persons of bad character whose
presence tended to drive away respectable clientele, and exposed him to
constant investigation and harassment by the police. In a second count,
plaintiff's wife alleged the same general harm to her reputation, and added
the charge that she had been subjected to derision, insults and indecent
proposals, which caused her to become ill. All of these were held to be
descriptive of general damages only, and the action failed.
PARASITIC AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Once a cause of action has been established, either from the character
of the defamation itself or by the proof of special pecuniary loss; all damages, whether special or not, may be recovered, as, for example, mental
suffering,20 and loss of sleep. 21 In addition, of course, when malice is shown,
22
exemplary damages may be awarded.
RONALD HANKIN
16 318 Ii. App. 15, 47 N.E.2d 502 (4th Dist. 1943).
17 306 Ill. App. 569 (Ist Dist. 1940).
18 281 Il. App. 495 (4th Dist. 1935).
19 46 Ill. App. 2d 355 (Ist Dist. 1964).
20 Adams v. Smith, 58 Ill. 417 (1871); Welker v. Butler, 15 Ill. App. 209 (4th Dist.
1884); Moore v. Maxley, 52 Ill. App. 647 (4th Dist. 1910).
21 Gallagher v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 177 111. App. 198 (4th Dist. 1913); O'Malley
v. Illinois Publ. & Printing Co., 194 Ill. App. 544 (1st Dist. 1915).
22 Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist. 1946).

